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The purpose of this research is to evaluate and refine a safety information 
management system that will facilitate data collection, organization, query, analysis and 
reporting of maintenance errors that contribute to Naval Aviation mishaps, equipment 
damage and personnel injury using OPNAV 3750.6R, Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System Maintenance Extension taxonomy.    The target audience for this 
information management system tool included safety personnel, mishap investigators, 
Aircraft Mishap Board (AMB) members, and analysts.  A review of three areas was 
needed to refine the prototype tool: (1) the collection, use and management of accident 
information, (2) human error theories as related to aviation mishaps and (3) the design of 
an effective mishap database tool.  A usability study was conducted using potential end-
users.  Fifteen Naval Aviation Safety Officers and Naval Aviators were given written 
procedures to navigate through the prototype and an exit survey.  The survey responses, 
including objective and subjective responses about the prototype were gathered.  The 
results indicate, that with proper training, the prototype could provide insight into 
maintenance errors, which could be used to target hazards and develop intervention 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
 From Fiscal Year (FY) 1951 to 1999 Naval Aviation has had great success in 
substantially reducing its Class A Flight Mishap (FM) rate (see Figure 1).  Even with this 
accomplishment, the proportion of mishaps attributed to human error has remained 
relatively constant at 80 percent (Nutwell & Sherman, 1997).  In 1996, a Navy F-14 
Tomcat crashed shortly after taking off from Nashville, Tennessee killing both aircrew 
and three civilians on the ground.  Because the cause of this mishap was exclusively 
human error, Department of the Navy (DON) leaders chartered a Human Factors Quality 
Management Board (HFQMB) to reduce mishaps by identifying systemic improvements 
to enhance performance and systems that guard against error.  The HFQMB’s goal was to 
reduce human error in the Naval Aviation Class A FMs rate by 50 percent at the start of 
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Figure 1. Naval Aviation Class A FM Rates for FY 1951-1999 
(From NSC, 2000) 
 
The HFQMB adopted a three-prong approach to tackle human error.  The first 
thrust was to conduct an extensive mishap data analyses focused on human factors.  The 
Naval Safety Center (NSC) developed the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 




 identifies areas for potential intervention by fully describing factors that are precursors to 
accidents.  HFACS identifies both active failures and latent conditions within four 
categories:  (1) unsafe acts, (2) pre-conditions for unsafe acts, (3) unsafe supervision,  
and (4) organizational influences (DON, 2001).  NSC adopted HFACS for analyzing 
aircrew error in Naval Aviation mishaps and targeting appropriate areas (DON, 2001).    
Naval Aviation achieved its lowest Class A FM rate in FY 1999 partly due to the 
efforts of the HFQMB.   Even with this reduction, the HFQMB failed to achieve the 
desired 50 percent reduction in human error (NSC, 2001).  A study noted that HFACS 
could be extended to cover maintenance errors; hence, HFACS was adapted to classify 
maintenance errors (Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Hardee, 1997).   
The maintenance extension (ME) of  HFACS contains four human error 
categories:  (1) Management Conditions, (2) Working Conditions, (3) Maintainer 
Conditions, and (4) Maintainer Acts.  A review of 470 Naval Aviation Mishaps by 
Schmorrow  (1998) determined the HFACS--ME taxonomy was an effective 
classification for determining trends in maintenance mishaps.  Building on Schmorrow’s 
research, Fry (2000) developed Maintenance Error Information Management System 
(MEIMS) for the analysis of maintenance related mishaps.  MEIMS lead to a refinement 
of HFACS--ME, and made the data more comprehensive and accessible.   
Fry’s rudimentary MEIMS was further refined by Wood (2000) and developed 
into a working prototype for fleet test and evaluation.  A usability study of the MEIMS 
prototype determined it could not only be effective system in determining trends, but also 
providing information for mishap prevention efforts.  Wood’s study identified a need to 
incorporate HFACS--ME definitions, improve the user interface, simplify data entry 
procedures, and provide example mishap scenarios.  The MEIMS tool was further refined 
by McCracken (2000), and training incorporated a user tutorial.  His study revealed that 
participants in the tutorial group performed better using MEIMS than the non-tutorial 
group.  Recommendations from McCracken’s study include better main menu navigation, 
improved data error checking, and making and the tutorial available over the Internet.   
This thesis is part of ongoing effort to study the feasibility and utility of MEIMS 
as a tool for investigating, collecting, and analyzing maintenance mishaps and 




 able to easily access valuable safety information, which can be used in training, hazard 
identification and trend analysis to prevent possible future mishaps.   
 
B. PURPOSE 
The intent of this study is to refine, expand, and revaluate the MEIMS tool to 
facilitate the collection, organization, query, analysis, and reporting of maintainer errors 
that contribute to Naval Aviation maintenance mishaps.  The goal is to provide an 
effective tool to promote the use of  HFACS--ME as part of the revised Naval Aviation 
Safety Program Instruction (OPNAVINST 3750.6R).   
 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In order to continue to reduce the annual mishap rate, Naval Aviation leadership 
is expanding the focus of their safety initiatives to encompass maintenance errors.   The 
systematic analysis of maintenance mishaps offers an increased opportunity to reduce the 
mishap rate, save lives and assets, as well as increase fleet readiness.  The HFACS--ME 
as it is incorporated into MEIMS provides a well-designed information management 
system to effectively identify maintenance error patterns and trends.  The current 
prototype MEIMS is a valuable tool; however, it needs to be refined and enhanced to 
capitalize on current technologies and to include mishap investigation. This thesis 
examines the following questions: 
1. How can MEIMS be used to facilitate preliminary mishap investigation? 
2. How will investigators use this tool? 
3. What processes are needed to capture maintenance error under          
OPNAVINST 3750.6R? 
4. What enhancements are needed to make MEIMS more user interactive/friendly? 
5. Could this tool be Web-based, making it more easily/widely accessible?  
 An effective information management system will give the fleet users the ability 
to quickly access standardized error data relating to aviation maintenance mishaps.  
Providing an easy-to-access error database will ensure standardization, as well as increase 
the validity and reliability of the data.   Ready access to error data will allow maintainers 




 train personnel to avoid future occurrences, thus reducing aircraft mishaps.  This 
reduction in mishaps can save lives, aircraft, and equipment.  
 
D.  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
Fleet personnel, primarily consisting Aviation Safety Officers, were tasked to 
evaluate the prototype MEIMS tool.  The prototype is intended to be refined for use by 
Naval Aviation squadrons, but may have some crossover use by other Military Services, 
government organizations, and the private sector.  This study only focuses on 
maintenance mishaps caused by human error.  Material failure, maintenance hazards, and 
personnel injuries not reaching the threshold of a mishap were not used within this study. 
 
E. DEFINITIONS 
This study uses the following abbreviations, terms, and associated definitions: 
Aircraft Mishap Board (AMB).  Group of officers appointed to investigate and 
report on an aviation mishap (DON, 2001). 
Aviation Safety Officer (ASO).  Principal advisor to Naval Aviation squadron 
commanding officers on all aviation safety matters (DON, 2001). 
F-14 Tomcat.  US Navy aircraft.  Two aircrew, two engines, swing-wing, 
supersonic fighter with air-to-air, air-to-ground, and reconnaissance capability (Rowe & 
Morrison, 1973). 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).  System designed 
to help analyze Naval Aviation mishaps focusing on aircrew error (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 1997).   
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System--Maintenance Extension 
(HFACS--ME).  HFACS adaptation to classify causal factors that contribute to 
maintenance mishaps (Schmidt, 1996). 
Human Factors Quality Management Board (HFQMB).  Established by Naval 
Aviation senior leadership to reduce human error involvement in Naval Aviation Class A 
flight mishaps (HFQMB, 1997).   
Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS).  Prototype error 




 Mishap.  A Naval mishap is an unplanned event or series of events directly 
involving Naval aircraft, which result in $20,000 or greater cumulative damage to naval 
aircraft, other aircraft, property, or personnel injury (DON, 2001). 
Mishap Categories.  Naval aircraft mishap categories are defined below (DON, 
2001): 
Flight Mishap (FM). Those mishaps resulting in $20,000 or greater DOD 
aircraft damage or loss of a DOD aircraft, and intent for flight for DOD aircraft 
existed at the time of the mishap. Other property damage, injury, or death may or 
may not have occurred. 
Flight Related Mishap (FRM). Those mishaps resulting in less than 
$20,000 DOD aircraft damage, and intent for flight (for DOD aircraft) existed at 
the time of the mishap, and $20,000 or more total damage or a defined injury or 
death occurred. 
Aircraft Ground Mishap (AGM). Those mishaps in which no intent for 
flight existed at the time of the mishap and DOD aircraft loss, or $20,000 or more 
aircraft damage, and/or property damage, or a defined injury or death occurred.  
Mishap Rate.  Number of aviation mishaps per 100,000 flight hours (DON, 2001). 
Mishap Severity Class.  Mishap severity classes are based on personnel injury and 
property damage (DON, 2001): 
Class A.  A mishap in which the total cost of property damage (including 
all aircraft damage) is $1,000,000 or greater; or a naval aircraft is destroyed or 
missing; or any fatality or permanent total disability occurs with direct 
involvement of naval aircraft. 
Class B.  A mishap in which the total cost of property damage (including 
all aircraft damage) is $200,000 or more, but less than $1,000,000 and/or a 
permanent partial disability, and/or the hospitalization of five or more personnel. 
Class C.  A mishap in which the total cost of property damage (including 
all aircraft damage) is $20,000 or more but less then $200,000 and/or injury 
results in five or more lost workdays. 
Naval Aircraft.  Refers to US Navy, US Naval Reserve, US Marine Corps, and 




 The Naval Aviation Safety Program (OPNAVINST 3750.6R).  US Navy 
instruction outlining Naval Aviation’s safety program. (DON, 2001). 
Operational Risk Management (ORM).  A decision making tool to increase 
effectiveness (and hence decrease accidents) by anticipating hazards, reducing the 
potential for loss due to these hazards, and thus increasing the probability of a successful 
mission (DON 1997). 
NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions (OPNAVINST 3710).  US 
Navy instruction outlining Naval Air Training and Operating Standardization program to 
improve combat readiness and achieving a substantial reduction in aircraft mishaps 
(DON 1997). 
 
F.  CHAPTER ORGANIZATION  
Chapter II contains a literature review on the development of a prototype database 
tool to identify human error involvement and patterns in aviation maintenance mishaps.  
The methods used in this study are discussed in Chapter III.  The results of this study are 



















 II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
 
 The literature studied encompasses human error, maintenance error in aviation, 
and error classification and analysis.  It includes work from textbooks, research articles, 
and master theses pertaining to: (1) management of accident information, (2) human error 
theories and their relation to maintenance related aviation mishaps, and (3) design and 
usability of a mishap database tool.  This information provides the foundation for the 
ongoing expansion and refinement of a prototype maintenance error analysis and 
reporting mishap database tool.  While numerous efforts are ongoing to reduce the 
number of Class A FMs in Naval Aviation, there is potential for further improvement, in 
particular the area of maintenance error.   
 
B.  ACCIDENT INFORMATION 
 
1. Investigation 
Grimaldi & Simonds (1984) detailed a four-part process for accident 
investigations.  First the investigator must explore the history, including activities 
occurring both during and prior to the event.  Second, the investigator must collect as 
many facts relating to the incident as possible, from reliable witnesses, videotapes, 
maintenance and training records.  Next, the physical environment associated with the 
accident must be studied.  Finally, common causal factors can be used to determine 
probable causal factors of the mishap.  This process parallels aspects of that provided by 
Diehl (1991) in his model of aviation accident investigation.   
Diehl’s (1991) three-stage model of accident investigation and prevention focuses 
on human performance and systems safety considerations (see Figure 2).  The Accident 
Generation stage involves hazard identification.  The mere existence of hazards has the 
potential to lead to an incident, or worse, an accident.  A study of thousands of accidents 
by Heinrich (1941) determined that for every major accident, there are approximately 30 
minor accidents, and 300 hazardous incidents.  This relationship among hazards, 






Figure 2. Accident Generation, Investigation, and Prevention Elements 
(From Diehl, 1989) 
 
The Accident Investigation stage includes the collection, analysis, and review of 
accident data.  Mishaps rarely result from a single, sudden event, but rather they are tied 
to a series of events degrading equipment and crew performance until an accident is 
inevitable (Nance, 1986).  Aircraft accident investigation procedures require investigators 
to determine what happened, and subsequently what caused the mishap.  The analysis is 
captured in a final report containing accepted findings, root causes, and prevention 
recommendations.  This phase is subjective in nature, but is based on examining 
comparative data, on aircraft performance, and on human capabilities/limitations.   
The Accident Prevention stage details the methods used to avoid future accidents.  
There are four categories of accident-prevention measures:  (1) eliminating hazards and 
risks, (2) incorporating safety features (3) providing warning devices, and (4) establishing 
procedural safeguards.  As one travels from right to left along the bottom leg of Diehl’s 
triangle (see Figure 2), the measures become less expensive, less effective, and less 
restrictive (Diehl, 1991). 
2. Reporting 
Accident reports generally centered on number of episodes and observations per 
unit of time (Brown, 1990).  Frequencies and rates, however, do not provide a sound 
basis for understanding accidents.  The traditional reporting format does not normally 




 collection, classification, and data recording methods are accurate and reliable will 
significantly assist in the determination of causes and prevention of future mishaps and 
overall increase the usability of the mishap report.   
Three elements critical to ensuring accurate and reliable mishap reports are 
(Chapanis, 1996): (1) properly trained investigators, (2) good accident reporting forms, 
and (3) a centralized facility for dealing with reports.  Analyzing typical reporting 
systems data is accomplished through the following process (Wood, 2000): 
• collecting data on past accidents within a population; 
• dividing the sample into groups with and without accidents; 
• obtaining measurements of individual characteristics on all participants; 
• statistically comparing the two groups; and  
• identifying any significant difference between the two groups, associating 
the differential characteristic with accidents.  
These methods result in a more complete and thorough analysis effort. 
3. Data Management 
In order for data to be useful in the prevention of accidents, it must be collected 
and properly cataloged and stored for future inquires (National Safety News, 1975).  
Coding the data and the use of databases to store the information have become 
universally accepted methods.  In 1975 the National Safety Council established a method 
where numerical codes are assigned to the different classifications in the mishap 
(National Safety News, 1975).  This aggregation of mishap data permits trend 
identification and factor concentration to focus on specific causal factors.  Obtaining data 
alone will not prevent future mishaps; the conditions contributing to the incident must be 
corrected.   Further, it can be argued that not only should accidents be analyzed, but 
“near-miss” situations should be addresses, as well (Pimbel & O’Toole, 1982).  
Recognition of near-misses identify potential conditions or practices that are accident-
producing types and prevent their future occurrence.   
Setting up a computer analysis program can reduce man-hours involved in 
reviewing mishap histories (Kuhlman, 1977).  Computer analysis tools can significantly 




 system in reducing future accidents and incidents, the tools must be well organized and 
tabulate the data logically.  The user interface to the data must be presented sensibly and 
in a easy to understand user-friendly format.    
4. Accident Prevention 
Accident prevention began in the first part of the 20th century when employers 
realized that it was less expensive to prevent accidents than to pay for their consequences 
(Petersen, 1978).  Initially accident prevention was based on a notion that people 
committing unsafe acts, not their working environment, were to blame for most accidents 
(Heinrich, 1959). This accepted wisdom fostered a preoccupation with assigning blame to 
people; a practice, which hindered the development of systematic accident prevention 
well into the latter half of this century (Manuele, 1981).  Focusing on people and not on 
the environment in which they operate tended to obscure a subset of associated causal 
factors.  This is especially true with systems that persistently expose individuals to 
hazards (Schmidt, 1996).  The practice of blaming the individual and not the environment 
still exists even with advances in accident prevention over the past decades.  In order to 
prevent future accidents, they must be analyzed in terms of the environment in which 
they occur and not point all the blame to the individual. 
Organizations confronted with the challenge of how best to protect themselves 
and their employees from accidents have two options: (1) insurance, and (2) accident 
prevention programs (Pate-Cornell, 1996). Organizations typically employ both options 
(Kanis & Weegels, 1990).  The most effective accident prevention strategies employ 
systems engineering (Hawkins, 1993).  Developed in the 1950s the system engineering 
approach was a part of the United States military’s large-scale weapons programs.  It 
transforms operational needs into a description of system parameters and integrates them 
to optimize overall system effectiveness (Edwards, 1988).  Systems engineering focuses 
the level of analysis on the smallest identifiable system components and how they 
interact (Bird, 1980).  The strategy of focusing on the system through the development of 
well-defined system components exposes information that would have remained 
unknown without a system-level evaluation (Miller, 1988).  System engineering not only 
breaks down the system, but also pays attention to the strengths and limitations of the 




 Numerous reviews suggest that 80 to 90 percent of accidents are attributable to human 
error (NSC, 2001).  Therefore, to totally understand way a system failed, human factors 
associated with the accident must be evaluated. 
 
C. HUMAN ERROR 
 
Analyzing and correcting for human error in aviation can greatly increase safety.  
There are numerous theoretical approaches to examine mishaps involving human error 
(Goetsch, 1996).  Some of these approaches have their roots in industrial safety, while 
others are viewed from a more complex systems perspective, with an emphasis on human 
factors and the operator.  Three well recognized approaches are outlined in Table 1. 
Table 1. Theoretical Approaches to Defining Accident Processes (From Schmidt, 
1998) 
Source Model Approach 
Industrial Safety Heinrich’s Domino Theory Linear 
Systems Safety Edwards’ SHEL Model Interface 
Human Factors Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model Vertical 
 
1. Heinrich’s “Domino” Theory 
Heinrich’s Domino Theory views accidents as a linear sequence of related factors 
(see Figure 3) or chain of events that lead to an actual mishap (Bird, 1980).  This theory 
is built upon two central precepts:  (1) injuries are caused by the action of preceding 
factors, and (2) removal of the central factors negates the actions of the preceding factors, 
and in doing so, prevents accidents and injuries (Goetsch, 1996).  Domino Theory 
encompasses a five-step sequence (Heinreich, Petersen & Roos, 1980): 
1. Lack of Control:  This is a management issue where the emphasis is placed on 
the control exercised in a situation for an array of factors.   
2. Basic Cause(s):  This identifies the origin(s) of the causes and includes aspects 
such as human factors, environmental factors, or job-related factors. 




 are symptoms of the basic causes.    
4. Incident:  This typically involves contact with the hazard, and for example, 
results in a fall or impact with moving objects. 
5. Person Injury and Property Damage: This includes lacerations, fractures, 
death and material damage. 
Much like falling dominos, each step causes the next to occur.  If factors from any of the 
first three dominos are removed, the chain of events will be broken and the accident will 
be prevented.   
Figure 3. Domino Theory Model (From Bird, 1980) 
2. Edwards’ SHEL Model 
Developed in the early 1970s, the SHEL Model provides an effective means to 
evaluate human-machine systems failures (Edwards, 1988).  The model describes 
systems, problem areas, and provides a framework for accident investigation.  
Furthermore, the model identifies human-machine systems failures and classifies them 
into four dimensions:  (1) Software, (2) Hardware, (3) Environment conditions,            
and (4) Liveware.   
• Software: Typically a collection of documents including rules, regulations, 
laws, orders, standard operating procedures, customs, practices, and habits 
that govern how a system operates and information is organized  
• Hardware:  Buildings, vehicles, equipment and materials of which the system 
is comprised and the operator works with/in.  




 • Liveware:  People involved directly with/in and tied to the system.   
The SHEL model (Edwards, 1988) is composed of these four basic components 
and the interface between them (see Figure 4).  Failures may occur in the system when 
one component or the connections between them fail.  Mishaps are rarely associated with 
only one component or interface; they are in fact caused by the interaction of many 
factors (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997).   This is affirmed in the Naval Aviation system 
program, that is based on necessitarianism -- mishaps are the inevitable result of their 
antecedent causes which preceded them (DON, 2001).   
 
Figure 4. SHEL Model of System Design (From Hawkins, 1993) 
3. Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” Model  
Reason’s (1990), Swiss Cheese Model is an internationally accepted perspective 
on accident causation. It employs a human factors approach to view the vertical 
association of a collection of factors that eventually lead to an accident.  The Swiss 
Cheese Model distinguishes errors into two types:  1) active failures -- the effects felt 
immediately, and 2) latent conditions, where effects may lie dormant until triggered by 
other mitigating factors.  Put simply, latent conditions set “the stage” for an accident 
while active failures are the final catalyst when a mishap occurs.  Defenses or safeguards 
in a system can prevent latent conditions from taking effect, thus reducing the probability 
for an active failure to occur.  The model can be seen as a row of Swiss cheese slices, 
each vertical slice representing a defense layer, and each hole representing a failed or 
missing defense.  At times the holes may be enlarged and can be aligned leading to a 
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Figure 5. Swiss Cheese Model (From Reason, 1990) 
4. Human Factors Analysis & Classification System (HFACS) 
In order to capture human errors in Naval Aviation mishaps, NSC staff developed 
the HFACS taxonomy (DON, 2001).  The goal of this taxonomy is to identify areas for 
potential intervention by fully describing factors that are precursors to accidents.  HFACS 
evolved from the expansion of Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model and incorporated features 
of Heinrich’s Domino Theory and Edwards’ SHEL Model (Shappel & Wiegmann, 1997). 
 The resulting HFACS taxonomy focuses on aircrew errors and identifies both 
active failures and latent conditions within four categories: 1) Unsafe Acts, 2) Pre-
conditions for Unsafe Acts, 3) Unsafe Supervision, and 4) Organizational Influences 
(DON, 2001).  NSC has adopted the HFACS Model for analyzing human error in Naval 
Aviation mishaps and uses it as a targeting tool for appropriate prevention.  
5. HFACS –Maintenance Extension (HFACS--ME) 
Although very useful, the HFACS taxonomy only focused on aircrew errors.  
Schmidt, Schmorrow, and Hardee, (1997) noted that this taxonomy could be extended to 
include maintenance errors; hence, they developed HFACS--ME to classify maintenance 
mishaps causal factors. This new classification system captures maintenance human 
factors by facilitating the recognition of absent or defective defenses at four levels:       




 Working Conditions and (4) Unsafe Maintainer Acts (see Figure 6).  This taxonomy 
visibly addresses Marx’s (1998) legitimate concern that human error has been under 
served by traditional maintenance error analysis systems.  Effectively employed, 
HFACS--ME is used to identify maintenance errors and their causes and target 
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Figure 6. HFACS--ME Model (From DON, 2001) 
 
Management, Maintainer, and Working Conditions are latent conditions that can 
impact the performance of a maintainer (Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Hardee, 1997).  These 
latent conditions may contribute to an Unsafe Maintaner Act, an active failure, and 
directly lead to a Maintenacne incident, personal injury, or an unsafe maintenance 
condition.  Unsafe Maintainer Acts are active failures, which directly or indirectly lead to 
a latent condition that the aircrew will have to deal with during flight.  Maintenance 
conditions have the potential to become a latent condition, which will manifest into an 
active failure in flight that the aircrew will then have to address.  Maintainer working 
conditions, as compared to those of the aircrew, will often play a more significant role in 
errors observed during maintenance evolutions (DON, 2001).  The three orders of 
maintenance error: (1) first, (2) second, and (3) third order, reflect a decomposition of the 





 Table 2. HFACS--ME Categories (From DON, 2001) 












Adverse Mental State 
Adverse Physical State Medical 
Unsafe Limitation 
Inadequate Communication 






Personnel Readiness Infringement 
Inadequate Lighting/Light 
Unsafe Weather/Exposure Environment 























 Management Conditions, either organizational or supervisory, may contribute to 
an active failure due to unforeseen events or lack of proper leadership.  Maintainer 
Conditions that can contribute to an active failure include: (1) medical, (2) crew 
coordination, and (3) readiness factors by the maintainer.  Working Conditions that can 
contribute to an active failure include: (1) environment, (2) equipment, and (3) the 
workspace the maintainer operates. (DON, 2001)   
6. Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS) 
Using the HFACS--ME taxonomy as a framework, a MEIMS prototype database 
tool was developed (Fry, 2000).  MEIMS is intended for fleet users to collect, catalog, 
collate, and analyze human error in Naval Aviation maintenance mishaps.  Wood (2000) 
after refining MEIMS, conducted a usability study and demonstrated the tool was 
effective, yet lacking in some areas.  Specifically, MEIMS was hard to navigate, required 
HFACS--ME familiarity/training, and had poor data entry configuration.  Woods (2000) 
concluded that for MEIMS to reach its full potential, it needed design refinements and 
more usability testing.  
McCracken (2000) further refined MEIMS by developing a user tutorial. He 
administered the tutorial to half of his test subjects. The tutorial group found MEIMS to 
be of more interest than the non-tutorial group.  Both groups, those given the tutorial and 
those without, advocated MEIMS relevance to maintenance operations and strongly 
endorsed it, but they also pointed out additional potential problem areas, to include:      
(1) improve the graphical user interface, (2) include the tutorial as part of MEIMS,        
(3) develop normal graph presentations, (4) bring the database up to date, and (5) make 
MEIMS (and the tutorial) available on the World Wide Web.  It was concluded that once 
available online, and with the proper training, MEIMS should be a useful tool in the 
effort to preserve lives, material and readiness (McCracken, 2000). 
 
D. TOOL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
 
1. System Design 
The usability of any software product can be linked directly to its user interface 




 will have postive usability evaluations.  Cleary, the user interface is the most important 
factor in determining the success or failure of a software application (Wickens, Gordon & 
Liu, 1997).  To maximize the usability of an interface, Shneiderman (1997) proposed 
eight golden rules of graphical user interface design: (1) strive for consistency, (2) enable 
frequent users to use shortcuts, (3) offer informative feedback, (4) design dialogs to yield 
closure, (5) offer error prevention and simple error handling, (6) permit easy reversal of 
actions, (7) support internal locus of control, and (8) reduced short-term memory load.  
Designing an effective interface will increase the usability of any program.   
Consistency is the rule most frequently broken when designing a user interface.  
In similar situations the same action sequence should be required.  These consistencies 
include; identical terminology, menus, and help screens as well as layout, color, 
capitalization and fonts.  Fast display rates and short response time are attractions for 
frequent users.  To increase the pace of interaction, shortcuts should be provided; this can 
be accomplished with abbreviations, special keys, hidden commands and macros.  For 
every action, weather minor or major, there should be varying degrees of information 
feedback to the user.  This allows the user to fully understand their current status.  Every 
event should have a beginning, middle and end.  Information feedback at the completion 
of an event will give the user closure, a sense of accomplishment that the action was 
complete. (Shneiderman, 1997) 
 A system should be designed such that a user cannot make a serious error.  In 
handling error the system should detect the error and provide simple and specific 
instruction for recovery.  To relieve user anxiety and encourage exploration the system 
should permit reversible actions.  Designing an internal locus of control allows the user 
to feel in charge of the system and that the system respond to their actions.  This is 
accomplished by making the user the initiator of action rather than the responder to 
actions.  Lastly, to reduce short-term memory, system displays need to be kept simple, 
multiple page displays to be consolidated, training time allotted for new programs and 
integrated assistance information. (Shneiderman, 1997) 
2. Usability Study 
According to Nielson (1998) the usefulness of a system is determined by two 




 system is irrelevant to the user it will be a poor system regardless of its design.  Usability 
is a measure of how effective the user can navigate the system.  Usability is the measure 
of the quality of the user experience when interacting with a system, such as a Web site, 
software application, or any user operated device.  Nielson further breaks usability into 
five characteristics: (1) ease of learning; how fast can a new user sufficiently learn the 
program, (2) efficiency of use; once the system is learned, how fast the user can complete 
tasks, (3) memorability; how effective can previous users accomplish tasks without 
relearning the system, (4) error frequency and severity; how many errors occurred and 
how were they recovered, and lastly (5) subjective satisfaction; the users approval with 
the system.  All systems have all five of the usability characteristics and all need to be 
considered in any design project. (Nielson 1998)   
Frokjaer, Haertzum and Hornbaek (2000) adopted the International 
Standardization Organization definition for usability, which consists of three distinct 
aspects.  First is effectiveness, which is the accuracy and completeness with which users 
achieve certain goals.  Indicators of effectiveness include quality of solution and error 
rates.  Second is efficiency, which is the relation between the accuracy and completeness 
with which users achieve certain goals and the resources expanded in achieving them.  
Measures include task completion time and learning time.  Third is satisfaction, which is 
the user’s comfort with and positive attitudes toward the use of the system.  A successful 
software tool will be effective, efficient as well as satisfying to the users (Frokjaer, 
Haertzum & Hornbaek, 2000).     
Usability testing can ensure all contractual requirements have been completed, 
help maximize the usability of the system, and provide evidence of testing in cases where 
legal issues may arise.  Dependant on the need to bring the system to full production, 
varying degrees of system errors will be tolerated during testing.  However, as the 
number of system inputs increase, the testing becomes more difficult yet these tests are 
increasingly needed. (Shneiderman, 1997)  
Informal demonstrations to colleagues or customers can provide useful feedback, 
but formal reviews by experts have proven to supply more effective feedback (Nielsen & 
Mack, 1994).  Thus, system design and test should include expert reviewers who usually 




 reviews can be heuristic evaluations, guidelines reviews, consistency inspections, 
cognitive walkthroughs, or formal usability inspections (see Table 3).  Expert reviews can 
be scheduled at project milestones in the development, when experts are available, or 
when the project team is ready.   





Expert reviewers critique an interface to determine conformance 
with a short list of design heuristics such as the eight golden rules.
Guideline review 
The interface is checked for conformance with the organizational 
or other guidelines document. 
Consistency 
inspection 
Experts verify consistency across a family of interfaces, 
terminology, color, layout, input/output formats, within the 
interfaces, in the training materials and online help. 
Cognitive-
walkthrough 
Experts simulate users walking through the interface to carry out 
typical tasks.  Simulating the day in the life of the user should be 
part of the evaluation. 
Formal usability 
inspection 
Experts hold courtroom-style meeting, with a moderator to judge, 
to present the interface and to discuss its merits and weaknesses. 
 
When planning to conduct a usability study an important consideration is the 
length of the study (Dumas & Redish, 1994).  If the study is integrated with the design 
process, then the length can be reduced to a manageable level so as to not impose a 
burden on the expert and still provide useful feedback.  Formal testing, with 
comprehensive test reports requires eight to twelve weeks, if a strong collaboration is 
exhibited among team members and a shortened report format is used, then four to six 
weeks are required.  If a particular part of the system is to be studied with well-
established procedures, then one week may be appropriate.  Although discouraged, just-
in-time testing can provide useful information in a few days, if necessary. The length of 




 3. Computer-Human Interaction Design Issues 
Human Factors Engineering existed long before computers were developed and 
examines the relationship between humans and all types of machines (Carey, 1991).   
With the advent of computer systems, Human Factors in Information Systems (HFIS) 
became an area of interest.  According to Carey (1991) several disciplines contribute to 
and overlap with HFIS: (1) Computer Science, (2) Management Information Systems, (3) 
Human Factors Engineering, and (4) Computer-Human Interaction.  Each of these areas 
of study has a focus, which overlap with HFIS.  Carey (1991) uses a VENN diagram to 
illustrate the differences and similarities between the disciplines and the nature of HFIS, 
(see Figure 7).  A circle represents each of the four disciplines; the intersection of the 
circles represents HFIS.  The portion of each circle that overlaps with HFIS indicates 
how closely each area is related to HFIS.  
 
 Figure 7. Disciplines Contributing Knowledge to 
Human Factors in Information Systems (From Carey, 1991). 
 
 The following statements reflect the goals and purposes of each of the disciplines: (1) 
Computer Science is about optimizing computer efficiency, (2) Management Information 
Systems is about maximizing organizational effectiveness through information,             
(3) Human Factors Engineering is about increasing system performance by reducing 




 enhancing the user interface, and finally (5) HFIS is about increasing user effectiveness 
within an organization by enhancing the user interface and other human-to-computer 
contact such as training and user involvement in development (Carey, 1991). 
Brown (1989) states that a useful design philosophy for developing user-oriented 
human-computer interfaces is to consider the computer as a tool to aid the user in 
accomplishing tasks.  A tool, which requires more time, training and effort to use than the 
task requires without the tool, is a poorly designed system.  Brown recommends an eight-
step strategy for developing an effective computer-human interface: (1) establish the 
human-computer interface role in system development, (2) know the users, (3) define the 
tasks, (4) incorporate design guidelines, (5) train software designers in computer-human 
interface design, (6) develop user interface software tools, (7) prototype and user testing, 
and lastly (8) designing by interactive refinement.  “The most important thing to know 
regarding your user is that he is not interested in using your product. He is interested in 
doing his work, and your product must help him do it more easily” (Heckel, 1994). A 
well-designed computer interface will aid users in completing assigned tasks.   
In establishing the computer-human interface role in systems development, 
management support, participation as team members, and appreciation for design 
tradeoffs are critical to the success of the design.  Users must be directly involved in the 
design process from its infancy, knowing the users are critical to successful system 
design.  Design must be based on an understanding of the tasks the users will perform 
with the system, and the environment in which it will be used.  User interface guidelines 
must be developed, documented, revised, maintained and customized to the context and 
constraints of the project.  Systems analysts, programmers, and other developers often 
need to be trained to the concepts and philosophy of computer-human interface design.  
Interface software tools can enhance the consistency in the interface and provide an 
environment where interactive design is simple.  It also benefits in program modularity, 
data independence, and development time and cost.  Testing early in the development 
cycle can reveal flaws in concepts or assumptions about what users need and want.  
Design features and concepts must be tested on people from the population of users for 
which the system is targeted.  Finally, as ongoing tests reveal needed changes and 




 updating costs low.  The problems discovered in a test cycle must be resolved in a revised 
design. Then to assure the flaws are corrected, the revised design must be tested. (Brown, 
1989) 
 
E.  SUMMARY 
 
Over the last half century, Naval Aviation has made significant strides in reducing 
the mishap rate.  This reduction can be attributed to standardized reporting and 
investigation system, the use of systems engineering, the application of human error 
causation theory on mishap cause factors.  Mishap data is currently being collected, 
cataloged and stored for future reference.  This data is useless in preventing future 
fatalities unless a well-defined, systematic accident investigation, analysis, and reporting 
process is developed and tested.  No single universal system currently exits (Marx, 1998).  
Current technology exists that make organization of data relatively simple for the 
program and the user.  For Naval Aviation to further increase its safety record, a robust 
system for analyzing stored data for trend analysis and prevention is needed.   
 HFACS was developed to provide a more useful data analysis system.  With its 
success, HFACS was expanded to cover maintenance error, and HFACS--ME was 
developed.  Both have proven to be effective in capturing the nature of, and relationship 
among, latent conditions and active failure.  MEIMS was developed as a tool to capture 
maintenance error trends in aviation maintenance using the HFACS--ME taxonomy.  In 
limited usability studies, MEIMS proved to have great potential to increase safety 
awareness.  However, to fully reach its potential, MEIMS must be proven to be a user-
friendly system that users embrace.  In order to achieve this goal, MEIMS is undergoing 
further systems development and more rigorous usability testing.  With proper advances, 
MEIMS has the potential to analyze data, find trends, save taxpayers money, and 






















 III.  METHODOLOGY 
 
A.  MEIMS APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT 
 
The original version of MEIMS was programmed in Microsoft Access 97 using 
Visual Basic for Applications (VBA).  This prototype had very little documentation.  The 
FAA required that it be upgraded to Access 2000.   Because of the lack compatibility 
between Access 97 and Access 2000 a completely new version of MEIMS had to be 
developed.   
Flanders and Tufts, two Computer Science graduate students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, developed a revised version of MEIMS prototype for their research 
using Access 2000.  The authors’ contribution to the new MEIMS application was 
requirements generation, functional assessment, and program development support.  The 
author also developed a decision support investigation module based on the HFACS--ME 
taxonomy.  The investigation module assists the user in determining mishap causal 
factors and builds a preliminary investigation report.   A detailed description of the 
MEIMS application prototype can be found in Flanders and Tufts (2001) - Software Re-
engineering of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System – (Maintenance 
Extension) Using Object Oriented Methods in a Microsoft Environment. 
 
B.  RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
The MEIMS prototype tool was circulated to a representative sample of 
prospective end-users.  Participants were provided a prepared task list that required them 
to enter fictitious mishap data information, as well as navigate through and utilize 
features of the tool.  The participants navigated through the entire system and completed 
an exit survey.  The exit survey instrument included demographic background 
information, as well as quantitative and qualitative survey items designed to elicit users’ 
views and ideas.  The resulting data was inserted into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for 







C.  DATA COLLECTION 
 
1.  Participants 
 Fifteen students attending either the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), or the 
Aviation Safety Office (ASO) course, within the School of Aviation Safety at NPS, 
severed as participants in the research.   The NPS is comprised of officers from the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, as well as several foreign Services.  
Student demographics represent a wide cross section of Naval Aviators, Naval Flight 
Officers, DOD officers, Flight Surgeons, Aeromedical Safety Officers, and foreign 
nationals from a variety aircraft communities and platforms.  ASO course graduates are 
responsible for implementing and managing squadron safety programs and mishap 
investigation and reporting. NPS graduates, who are designated aircrew, typically return 
to aviation units in department head positions and play an integral role in safety 
initiatives.  
2.  Apparatus 
Participants were introduced to the HFACS--ME taxonomy and the MEIMS 
prototype mishap database tool through the use of a multimedia demonstration.  
Participants had access to three computer laboratories at the School of Aviation Safety 
via login ID and password to a group account.  Each computer system in the labs is a 
Pentium I, with a Windows 2000 operating system, and 15-inch monitor of 800 x 600 
resolution (or better).  All systems had a fully functioning MEIMS prototype mishap 
database tool loaded onto the hard drive.  After gaining access to the computer, the 
“MEIMS Tool” icon was selected to open the MEIMS prototype (see Appendix A). 
3.  Instrument 
The author constructed a participant usability survey consisting of three parts:   
(1) Participant demographics, (2) Likert-type quantitative assessment statements , and (3) 
Open ended qualitative items.  Demographic information was collected by participants 
selecting from a list of descriptors (rank, branch of Service, number of years in Service, 




 meets user investigation, reporting, and analysis requirements.  Likert-type statements 
used a five-point rating scale: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly 
Disagree, to capture the participant’s opinions.  The open ended questions were 
constructed to elicit the subjects overall impression of the prototype software tool, 
recommendations for improvement, and an area for additional comments not adequately 
covered by the first two portions. 
4.  Procedure 
The MEIMS application containing a database derived from compiled NSC 
maintenance mishaps was loaded on computer systems in the labs with 24-hour 
accessibility.  There was a MEIMS icon on each computer desktop to allow easy access 
to the application.  Before logging on, participants were given a training tutorial and 
instruction manual for MEIMS.   
Testing was conducted over a one week period.  All participants were given a 
group orientation on the purpose, goals, and procedures for the prototype including a 
computer demonstration, and materials necessary to carry out the user test.  These 
materials included: 
• Instructions for accessing the Prototype tool – information to log on and 
open the prototype (See Appendix B). 
• MEIMS Evaluation – A series of planned navigation routes for every area 
of the prototype. (See Appendix B). 
• MEIMS Exit Survey – Participants completed an exit survey composed of 
demographic background questions, impressions of MEIMS and the 
investigation module and open ended questions requesting participant’s 
opinions (See Appendix C). 
All participants performed the following actions: (1) accessed the prototype tool, (2) 
navigated the system using the prototype task list, and (3) provided feedback on the 
system by completing the exit survey.  The anonymously completed exit surveys were all 







 D.  DATA TABULATION 
 
The collected data were transcribed from the survey into a Microsoft Excel 2000 
spreadsheet.  The Likert-type statements, based on a five-point scale, are coded into the  
software using number 1 through 5 to correspond respectively with (1) Strongly Agree, 
(2) Agree, (3) Neutral, (4) Disagree, and (5) Strongly Disagree.   
 
E.  DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Descriptive statistics were generated using functions within Excel to include: (1) 
mean, (2) standard deviation, (3) range, and (4) frequency distribution of the collected 
data.  Content analysis was conducted on the responses provided from the open-ended 




 IV.  RESULTS 
A.  TEST SAMPLE 
 
A usability test was administered to 15 students at the Naval Postgraduate School.  
All participants were designated Naval Aviators or Naval Flight Officers and represented 
a cross section of the aviation commands that make up the squadrons in the Navy and 
Marine Corps.  No foreign Service students participated in the survey.  Each participant 
was given a MEIMS tool evaluation package with 10 tasks to complete and a brief 
tutorial on HFACS--ME.  After completing the tasks, participants were asked to complete 
an exit survey.  The survey consisted of demographic information and queries regarding 
their satisfaction with MEIMS.  
 
B.  TEST TASKS 
 
The tasks were designed to introduce the participants to MEIMS and exercise 
some of its capabilities.  The tasks required the participant to access all functional areas 
of MEIMS.  Test performance is summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Test Task Performance 
TASK n NUMBER CORRECT PERCENTAGE
   1 - Access Program 15 15 100% 
   2 - Main Menu Opinion 15 11 73% 
   3 - Aircraft Query 15 15 100% 
   4 - ID Factors 15 15 100% 
   5 – Access Information 15 14 93% 
   6 – Access Information 15 13 87% 
   7 – Access Information 15 14 93% 
   8 – Graph Information 15 15 93% 
   9 – ID Mishap 15 15 100% 





 The first task was accessing the program; all participants (n=15; 100%) were able 
to access MEIMS without difficulty.  The second task requested the participants’ opinion 
of the main menu (See Figure A1, Appendix A). The majority of participants (n= 11; 
73%) responded that the menu was easy to understand.  Other participants noted that the 
average computer user might not understand “query”.  Tool tips would help in 
understanding what each function does, and one participant commented that he thought 
there would be a number of graphs under the graph menu.  One participant did not 
answer this question.  The third and forth tasks required the participant to query a type of 
aircraft, from the multiple criteria menu (See Figure A3, Appendix A), and then 
determine how many mishaps exist in the database for that type aircraft and how many 
factors existed for the first mishap.  All participants (n=15; 100%) were able to correctly 
accomplish these tasks.   The fifth, sixth and seventh tasks required the user to draw 
mishap information from the HFACS--ME Summary Form (See Figure A5, Appendix A) 
regarding the total number of mishaps and factors within the database.  Fourteen (93%) 
were able to correctly identify the answers for the fifth and seventh tasks.  On the sixth 
task thirteen (86%) were able to correctly identify the answer.  One participant had the 
right answers down for his specific aircraft, but not the total number of mishaps in the 
database.  The eighth task required the user to properly graph (See Figures A6 & A7, 
Appendix A) the mishap types versus the organization and determine how many aviation 
ground mishaps the U.S. Navy has had by clicking on a portion of the graph.  All 
participants (n=15; 100%) correctly identified the value.  Several participants commented 
on the difficulty of having to click on just the right spot on the graph and that some sort 
of roll over value would greatly enhance this function.  The ninth task required users to 
open up a specific report from the report menu (See Figure A8, Appendix A) and identify 
the number of total number of Class B mishaps.  All participants (n=15; 100%) were able 
to correctly identify the value.  The last task requested the participants’ opinions of the 
investigation portion (See Figures A10 to A20, Appendix A) and whether it helped them 
identifying the causal factors associated with the mishap scenario.  Thirteen participants 
(87%) felt that the section helped them in identifying the causal factors.  Two participants 





 C.  DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
The data collected in part one of the exit survey consisted of demographic 
information concerning participant’s computer and aviation experience levels.  This 
information was used to determine if the participants’ level of experience effected their 
satisfaction with the MEIMS prototype database tool.  Demographic information is 
summarized in Table 5.   
 









Squadron level maintenance 15 15 100% 
2 + years computer experience 15 15 100% 
Use Microsoft Office 15 15 100% 
Use word processing programs 15 15 100% 
Use word spreadsheet programs 15 15 100% 
Use presentations programs 15 15 100% 
Use graphic related software 15 10 66% 
Use E-Mail 15 15 100% 
Use Database programs 15 10 66% 
Use Windows (3.1-2000) 15 15 100% 
Use Windows NT  15 11 73% 
Use Macintosh 15 1 6% 
Use Linux 15 2 14% 
Use Unix 15 3 20% 
 
Question one determined that all participants had been or are members of aviation 
units that performed squadron level maintenance (n=15; 100%).  Question two indicated 
that all participants had at least two years of experience using a computer (n=15; 100%).  




 Office.  Question four established a participant’s familiarity with different software 
applications; all participants (n=15; 100%) were familiar with processing, spreadsheet, 
presentation, and e-mail.   A third (n=10; 66%) of the participants were familiar with both 
graphic and database applications.  Question five revealed what operating system the 
participates are familiar with working with.  All participants (n = 15; 100%) are familiar 
with Window 3.1, 95, 98, or 2000 while several (n=11; 73%) were familiar with 
Windows NT, one (6%) worked with Macintosh and few (n=3; 20%) and (n=2; 14%) 
were familiar with Unix and Linux respectively.   
 
D.  PARTICIPANT SATISFACTION WITH MEIMS TOOL 
 
1.  Responses to Impressions of MEIMS 
The information gathered in Part II of the exit survey requested the participants’ 
impressions of the MEIMS tool and its value to Naval Aviation.  Participants responded 
to five statements using Likert type responses selecting from one of five responses: (1) 
strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) neutral, (4) disagree, and (5) strongly disagree.  Values of 
five through one respectively were assigned to the statements.  Additionally, participants 
could make subjective comments on any of the statements. 
Statement one asked whether or not a participant found MEIMS to be presented in 
a logical form.  Almost all of the participants either strongly agreed (n=7; 47%) or agreed 
(n=7; 47%) that the MEIMS prototype was in a logical form while only one (6%) was 
neutral on whether it was logical. Figure 8 depicts the results for “being in a logical 







Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
 
Figure 8.  MEIMS is “In a Logical Form” 
Statement two asked about the ease of navigation of the prototype.  Almost all of 
the participants strongly agreed (n=8, 54%) or agreed (n=6, 40%) that the MEIMS 
prototype tool was easy to navigate.  Only one (6%) was neutral on the ease of 




Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
 
Figure 9.  MEIMS is “Easy to Navigate” 
Statement three asked the participants if  MEIMS was interesting.  Almost all of 
the participants strongly agreed (n=7; 47%) or agreed (n=6; 40%) that MEIMS was 
interesting.  Two (13%) of the participants were neutral on the whether MEIMS was 










Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
 
 
Figure 10.  MEIMS is “Interesting” 
 
Statement four asked about the relevance of MEIMS to aviation maintenance 
operations.  All of the participants either strongly agreed (n=8; 53%) or agreed (n=7, 
47%) that MEIMS is relevant to maintenance operations.  The results for maintenance 





Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
 
Figure 11.  MEIMS is “Relevant to Maintenance Operations” 
Statement five asked whether prototype concept was a good one.  All the 
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Figure 12.  MEIMS “Concept is Good” 
 
Statement six asked whether the participants found the investigation tool helpful.  
All of the participants either strongly agreed (n=11; 74%) or agreed (n=4; 26%) that the 
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 2.  Responses to Open-ended Questions 
Part III of the exit survey contained four open-ended questions regarding the 
participants overall satisfaction with MEIMS.  All participants took the opportunity to 
make comments.  The majority of comments were positive and indicated that MEIMS 
was a good tool that has the potential to be extremely valuable instrument in the 
prevention of mishaps  
Question one asked the participant to list the most positive aspects of the 
prototype.  Overall, the response was positive.  Six participants commented on MEIMS 
ease of use and ease of navigation.  Five participants commented on layout of MEIMS, 
the quantity of information and the thoroughness.  Several commented on the features 
that the user has the ability to capture trends.  Some sample inputs include: 
• “Quantifies other factors of a mishap beyond the aircrew.”   
• “It helps the ASO identify factors they may not have thought of.” 
• “Allows quick and easy input of data by trained Safety Officer/Individual.”  
•  “Ability for maintenance supervisors to query for specific 3rd level factors for 
briefing and training maintance personnel.”  
•  “The fact that it brings together all the mishap data in one place for easy 
access.” 
Question two asked for the most negative aspects of the prototype. Most 
comments were problems or suggested improvement to the interface.  A few left this area 
blank and some comments made had merit, but were beyond the scope of this study.  
Several of the comments focused on the users lack of understanding with the HFACS--
ME taxonomy terms and the fact that potential users would need some training.   Some 
sample comments include: 
• “A little cumbersome to use at first.” 
• “An explanation of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd level factors may be helpful.  Often the 
factors seem so similar that it almost get confusing as to which one is most 
appropriate.  If there was possibly something to go back to see some key 
words then it might help.” 




 • “Learning curve once past that everything is great.”   
Question three requested suggestions for changes to MEIMS. For the most part 
participants reiterated what they had stated previously and centered on training or their 
lack of knowledge of HFACS--ME.  Several participants left this area blank. A few of the 
comments include; 
• “Add a few standard icons to selection Menu.” 
• “Add Help Menu” 
• “Add tool tips.” 
• “Online tutorial to get started.” 
• “Spend the time to make it a little more user friendly without the aid of tool 
evaluation package, it would be difficult to use.” 
Question four requested suggestions for changing the investigation section of 
MEIMS.  Some participants’ comments again focused on their lack of understanding with 
the HFACS--ME taxonomy and the definitions of all its terms.  Several participants had 
no comment.  Two participants suggested that the user should have the option to go 
through the factor input wizard or manually enter the factors.  They felt that once the user 
became familiar with the taxonomy the factor input wizard would only slow them down.  
Several others responded positively about the ability to import the preliminary report into 
a Microsoft Word document.  Some comments include: 
• “I can’t say I would add anything more to this one particular portion, it 
certainly gives the database a lot more functionality.” 
• “Investigation module portion helpful but not as a stand-alone application, it 
would need to be integrated.” 
• “Possible examples of descriptions.” 
• “Add help menu that incorporate the legal and layman’s descriptions of 
mishap categories.” 
• “Should be able to skip the factor input status if factors are known.” 
Lastly there was a space for additional comments, they include; 
• “Great for a safety standown to look at the trends instead of always glossing 




 • “Good addition to the ASO tool kit.” 
• “Good training to give the maintenance department – so they know.” 




 V.  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A.  SUMMARY 
 
 Naval Aviation has always had great demand for high levels of operational 
readiness, equipment availability, and personal training.  These trends continue today, 
despite reduced budgets and aging aircraft.   To continue to meet this operational 
demand, it become vitally crucial to protect our assets, as replacement airframes are not 
likely in the foreseeable future.  In this financially strapped environment, costs of Naval 
Aviation mishaps, in terms of operational readiness, material resources, and operational 
capability are too high.  Therefore, reducing the number of mishaps is crucial to the 
continuing success of Naval Aviation.   Although not all mishaps are avoidable, reducing 
the mishaps involving human error becomes imperative.    
 In an effort to reduce human factor errors in Naval Aviation mishaps, recent 
efforts have targeted aircrew error.  This emphasis has resulted in the comprehensive 
HFACS taxonomy.  These early efforts resulted in a reduction of mishaps, but not to the 
extent Naval Aviation had hoped to achieve.  It was soon realized that the scope of 
mishap prevention must be expanded beyond aircrew error to included maintainer errors.   
This expanded scope resulted in the HFACS Maintenance Extension, or HFACS--ME.  
This taxonomy proved to be an acceptable method for classifying maintainer errors.  
Using the HFACS--ME taxonomy, a clear picture of the human factor errors contributing 
to maintenance mishaps could be formulated.   
 To fully tap into the potential of the HFACS--ME taxonomy, an existing 
prototype database tool, Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS) 
was developed and refined.  This enhanced MEIMS prototype mishap database tool, 
based on the HFACS--ME taxonomy, is a safety information management system used to 
facilitate the characterization and analysis of human error in Naval Aviation maintenance 
mishaps.  Users are able to query data, custom make graphs, view reports, conduct a 
preliminary investigation, as well as download and updated database file.    A Tool such 
as MEIMS has the potential to identify human errors patterns or trends and assist safety 





B.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The participants’ high level of satisfaction with the MEIMS prototype mishap 
database tool indicated a need for quick, accurate mishap data information for use in 
training, analysis, and investigations.  Participant feedback demonstrated that MEIMS is 
beneficial to fleet safety. However, as with any new major software program, there are 
areas that need improvements. 
 According to the quantitative survey items, the MEIMS prototype type received 
its highest ratings in ease of navigations and logical format.    For MEIMS to reach its 
full potential the following items must be completed: 
• Incorporate definitions of the HFACS--ME taxonomy terms into the 
application, this will enhance the users understanding of the taxonomy.   
• Create a users manual and help function. These will increase the user’s 
ability to understand the functions of MEIMS and increase their ability to 
access information quickly. 
Increasing the users knowledge of the MEIMS program, and all it functions, as 
well as providing more detailed information on the HFACS--ME taxonomy will make 
MEIMS a valuable program tool for any fleet unit. 
 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1.  Recommended Prototype MEIMS Tool Improvements 
• Incorporate HFACS--ME definitions within MEIMS. Better descriptions 
of the HFACS--ME causal factors will also improve usability and 
understanding. 
• Include a detailed description for each mishap to augment the brief 
description.  
• Include mishap data prior to 1989 and from 2000 to the current  




 • Change the aircraft identifier to include aircraft nickname in addition to 
type/model to avoid similar names.  
• Separate AH-1 and UH-1 into two categories, due to the aircraft’s 
differences. 
• Provide a link to the date-time-group of the Mishap Investigation Report. 
This will give the user the option to obtain the complete details 
surrounding a mishap. 
• Incorporate a help menu within the program and a user manual. This will 
improve the end-users knowledge of HFACS--ME and make MEIMS a 
more productive tool. 
• Expand this program to other areas with in the armed forces where 
maintenance is performed.  
• Develop a program similar to MEIMS using the aircrew factors taxonomy, 
HFACS. 
• Make MEIMS available over the World Wide Web. This will ensure that 
everyone, regardless of location, will have access to the data.   
 2.  The Future of MEIMS     
 MEIMS has developed into a comprehensive information management database 
tool for accessing mishap data information for use in training, analysis, and 
investigations.  This tool has the potential to save the Naval Aviation money, increase 
combat and personnel readiness, and, ultimately, save lives.  Even with this enormous 
potential, this program is only in its infancy.  Expanding the MEIMS concept to other 
areas within the Service where maintenance is performed could further enhance the safety 
impact.  Moreover, MEIMS could be further expanded to civil aviation where there is 






















 APPENDIX A 
 
PROTOTYPE MAINTENANCE ERROR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM (MEIMS) TOOL REVIEW 
 
1.  MAIN MENU 
 




Figure A1.  Prototype MEIMS Tool Main Menu 
 
Select the “Query Menu” command button to view Query Menu (see Figure A2). 
 
2.  QUERY MENU 
 
 
Figure A2.  Query Menu 
 
Select the “Multiple Criteria” command button. 







Figure A3.  Multiple Criteria Query 
 
Select one or multiple categories in the drop down boxes then click “View”, and the 
Summary of Mishap form appears (see Figure A4). 




Figure A4.  Summary of Mishap Form with F14 selected as Aircraft Type and US 
Navy as Organization. 
 
Select the inner right arrow after “Record:” to view additional Mishap Factors. 
Select the outer right arrow after “Record:” to view additional Mishaps. 
Select “Print” to view a printable record.   
Selecting “Done” will take you back to the Multiple Criteria Query (see Figure A3). 
Selecting the “HFACS--ME Summary” from the Query Menu (see Figure A2) will 







Figure A5.  HFACS--ME Summary Form 
 
Selecting one or multiple criteria from the drop down boxes and then selecting “Update” 
will recalculate the values in each of the factors boxes.   
Clicking on any factor box will bring up the Summary of Mishap Form (see Figure A4) 
for desired user input.   
Selecting Close will return the user to the Query Menu (See Figure A2) 
 
 
3.  GRAPH MENU 
 
Selecting the “Graph Menu” from the Main Menu (see Figure A1) will display the Graph 
















Figure A6.  Graph Menu 
Select one of the radial buttons to determine the value of the X-axis, and one of the radial 
buttons to determine the value of the Y-axis. 
Select “Show Graph” to display the Graph (see Figure A7). 
Checking the “Use codes to represent X-axis/Y-axis values will display the code vice the 




Figure A7. Graph Form 
 
Select “Type Chart” or “Dimensions” to change the type and style of chart. 








 4.  REPORT MENU 
 
Selecting the “Report Menu” from the Main Menu (see Figure A1) will display the 





Figure A8. Report Menu 
 
Selecting one of the “Cross-Tabbed Reports” will display the selected reported (see 
Figure A9). 





















 5.  INITIATE INVESTIGATION MENU 
 
Selecting the “Initiate Investigation from the Main Menu (see Figure A1) will open up a 





Figure A10. Mishap Investigations Form 
 




Figure A11.  Add new Mishap Investigations Form 
 
Select the appropriate data from the drop down boxes and enter a short and long mishap 
description.   If your data is not present in the drop down boxes select Code Maintenance 







Figure A12.  Mishap Class Form 
 





Figure A13. Mishap Category Form 
 













Figure A14.  Factor Input Menu 
 





Figure A15. First Level Management Factor form 
 
Select “Yes” to add a factor for first level factor that is stated on the form (see Figure 
A14). 
Select “No” if there is no factor for the first level factor that is stated on the form and 















Figure A16. Second Level Management Factor form 
 


















Figure A17. Third Level Management Factor form 
 
Select the appropriate third level factor from the drop down box. 
Write a brief description of the factor.   
Select “Next” when completed filling in the form.  The program will take the user back to 
the Factor Input Menu (see Figure A14) to continue entering factors until all factors for 
the mishap are entered into the program.  Once all factors are entered the user will get the 












Figure A18.  Finished Form 
 
Select “Back” if there are more factors to add. 





Figure A19. Mishap Data Entered Form 
 
Select “Print” to view the Investigation Mishap Report (see Figure A20). 
Selecting “Save” will save the data and return the user to the Mishap Investigations Form 





































Selecting “Administration” on the Main Menu (see Figure A1) will bring up the login in 













Figure A21.  Administrator Login Form 
 




Figure A22.  Successful Login Form 














Figure A23.  Administration Manage Mishaps Form 
 
Select “Add” to add a mishap and its associated factors.  
Select “Kill” to delete the highlighted record and its associated factors.   



















Figure A24:  Administration Manage Mishaps Form 
 
Figure A24.  Administration Manage Individual Mishaps Form 
 
Select “Print” to view the Investigation Mishap Report (see Figure A18). 
Select “Save” to change any data that has been changed. 
Select “Cancel” to either close the form or to cancel any changes you have made. 
 
7.   EXIT 
 




 APPENDIX B 
 
PROTOTYPE MAINTENANCE ERROR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM (MEIMS) TOOL EVALUATION 
 
Background.  Thank you for participating in a usability study (evaluation) of a 
prototype tool for the Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS).  
This tool was developed at NPS and has been modified based upon previous usability 
studies.  This study is being conducted by Capt Doug Nelson, USMC as part of a thesis 
project for his Master of Science program in Information Technology Management.  
MEIMS was developed to address and identify patterns of human error in Naval Aviation 
maintenance-related aircraft mishaps.  The Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System Maintenance Extension (HFACS--ME) taxonomy is the foundation of MEIMS 
and is an effective method for classifying and analyzing the presence of human error in 
maintenance operations leading to major mishaps, accidents of lesser severity, incidents 
and maintenance related personal injury cases.  Given the capability of the previous 
MEIMS systems an improved information management system was needed to fully 
capture Maintenance related factors and bring the system to the next level.   
 
MEIMS captures maintenance error data, facilitates the identification of common 
maintenance errors and associated trends, and supports understanding of how to identify 
human errors in the future.  The target audience for this information management system 
tool includes safety personnel (data entry & retrieval by unit safety officers, other safety 
& training personnel, maintenance officers, maintenance supervisors), mishap 
investigators-for data retrieval (Aircraft Mishap Board members, squadron safety 
officers), and analysts (from the Naval Safety Center, the command’s safety officer or 
one from its higher headquarters).  This tool can directly lead to a decreased mishap rate 
and overall increased mission readiness due to the training and analysis opportunity it 
provides. 
 
Usability Study.  You will be given a packet of instructions to guide you through 
MEIMS.  You will be asked to make comments on the effectiveness and usability of the 
prototype system during your testing phase.  Additionally, you will be asked to complete 
an “exit survey” after completion of your testing.  Questions will include demographic 
information, objective questions about MEIMS usability, and subjective questions and 
comments for areas not covered in the objective section.  The study should take no more 
than 20-30 minutes. 
 
Completion of Study.  Upon completion of your testing and survey you will be 
asked to return your packet of instructions to Capt Doug Nelson.  Thank you again for 
your participation. 
 
     




 Instructions for Prototype Maintenance Error Information Management System 




1. Go to a room E-322. 
 
2. When Log-in menu appears, Log-in using ASO ID and password. 
 
3. When Desktop (main Icon screen)  appears, double click on the HFACS-(ME) 
icon.  This will start the MEIMS application using Acess 2000 as an interface 
and SQL server as the database engine.   
  
Question 1:  Did you have any problems accessing the program?  Y / N (circle one) 





4.  You will now have the Main Menu displayed with the Supersonic Hornet and 
Osprey photos. 
 
5.  Note the six categories on the right portion of the screen.  
 
Question 2:  Is the terminology clear enough to understand what each of the six 










7. Note there are two sections on the Query Menu.  Multiple Criteria and 
HFACS--ME Summary 
 
8.  Select (click) Multiple Criteria   
 
9.  Another form appears: “Select Multiple Criteria Query”.  Select your type 
aircraft, and then select <View >.  The “Mishap Data” form appears.  Note the 
number of maintenance related mishaps is on the bottom of the outer box and the 
number of factors for that mishap are on the inner box.  You can cycle through 
mishaps or factors by selecting the (>) to the right of the number box.  Review the 




 selecting print will show you a printable report.   
 
Question 3:  What aircraft did you select?__________ 
 
Question 4:  How many separate mishaps of that aircraft type are in the 
database?______________ 
 
Question 5:  How many factors are there for the first mishap? ______________ 
 
10. Select “Done” when you are through.   
 
11. You are now free to choose other mishap information if you wish, or continue 
to step 12. 
 
12. Select “< Back”. 
 
13. Select “HFACS--ME Summary” 
 
14. HFACS summary by factor form appears.  This page will first display all the 
mishaps in the database and can be narrowed down by the user with the drop 
down boxes on the right and then selecting “Update” in the lower right hand 
corner.  The form displays the total number of mishaps (right center), as well 
as the number of mishaps for each factor and what percent that factor is to the 
total number of mishaps.    
 
Question 6: How many total mishaps are in the database?  __________ 
Question 7:  How many mishaps have a level one category of Management Conditions?  
________ 
Question 8:  What is the percentage of mishaps that have a 3rd level factor of Inadequate 
Design?   _______ 
 
15. Conduct further queries as desired or continue to step 16.  Note:  you can 
click on any factor box to bring up detailed information.   
 
16. Select “Close” 
 




18. Select “Graph Menu”   
 
19. The Database Graph Menu will appear.  Select “Mishap Type” for the X-axis 
value and “Organization” for the Y-axis value. 
 





21. A graph form will appear for the values selected.  You can click on the top 
center of any bar and the total number of mishaps for your selected values 
will show up on the bottom left. 
 
Question 9:  How many total Aviation Ground Mishaps does the US Navy have? ______ 
 
22. You are free to play with the graph menu or go onto step 23.   
 
23. Select “Close” 
 




25. Select “Report Menu” 
 
26. The Report Menu Form will appear. 
 
27. Select “Mishaps By Class” 
 
28. A HFACS--ME Summary report will appear.  Mishaps are organized by 
mishap class and the total number of mishaps will be displayed for that class.  
Each level factor will display the total number of mishaps that have that 
factor as a cause of the mishap as well as a percent compared to total 
mishaps.  To cycle through the other mishap classes click the right arrow (>) 
to the right of Page:  in the bottom left corner.      
 
Question 10:  How many total class B mishaps are there?  _________ 
 
29. Select “Close” at the top of the report to return to Report Menu. 
 
30. You can choose other reports if you wish, or go to step 31. 
 




The following scenario will help you in completing the following section; 
During a turnaround inspection the plane captain fell off an aircraft and broke 
his arm as well as damaged the aircraft.  Due to his injuries the plane captain 
missed two workdays, also there was aircraft damage in excess of $10,000. 
After a brief investigation of this incident you discover that the maintenance 
chief directed the plane captain to get the turnaround done despite the pouring 
rain outside.  You also discover that the plane captain had duty the night 





32. Select “Initiate Investigation” 
 
33. A new database program will open in Access 2000 and the Mishap 
Investigation form will appear.  This section is for the user to enter mishap 
data using the HFAC-ME taxonomy.  Select “Add” 
 
34. Add new mishap wizard will appear.  Fill in the appropriate information 
using your personal information and the scenario above.  You can fill in the 
same information for short and long description.  Click “Next >” when done. 
 
35. Mishap Class screen appears; check the appropriate injuries and cost boxes.  
Click “Next >” when done. 
 
36. Mishap Categories screen appears; check the appropriate category.  Click 
“Next >” when done 
 
37. Factor Input screen appears.  You are now going to be guided through the 
HFACS--ME taxonomy with a series of questions until all possible factors for 
your mishap have been entered.  Click “Next >” to continue. 
 
38. At the 3rd level screen you will select one of the third level factors and write a 
brief description of the factor that contributed to the mishap. Click “Next >” 
when done. 
 
39. Factor Input screen appears.  Click “Next >”, you will again be asked if there 
were any Management Conditions.  If you have no more Management 
Conditions to enter select “NO”.  Click “Next>” and continue this cycle until 
all factors have been entered for your mishap. Notice that a check will appear 
before each first level factor when you have completed that factor.   
 
40. When all factors are entered Click “Next>”.  You will be at the finished 
screen and select “Finished”   
 
41. The Mishap Data form will now have the data you entered.  Click on “Print” 
in the lower left section of the screen.   
 
42. The data is now arranged in report format suitable for printing. 
 
Question 11.  Do you feel this section helped you in identifying all possible factors for 










43. Select “Close” on the top left. 
 
44. Select “Cancel” 
 




50. The Administration section is for Adding, Deleting or modifying existing 
data in the database and is not a testable portion. 
 
Exit 
51. Select “Exit” 
 
52. Select “Yes” 
 





 APPENDIX C 
 
PROTOTYPE MAINTENANCE ERROR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM (MEIMS) TOOL EXIT SURVEY 
 
User’s Impression of the Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS) 
Prototype Tool 
 
Purpose:  This survey evaluates a user’s overall satisfaction of the Maintenance Error 
Information Management System (MEIMS) prototype tool.  It consists of three parts. 
 
 Part I:  Demographic Information.  Part I provides the user’s aviation 
background, computer experience, and availability of software and hardware systems 
used in the Navy and Marine Corps. 
 
 Part II:  User Satisfaction with the Four Sections of the MEIMS Prototype Tool.  
Part II deals directly with user feedback as they use the prototype tool. 
 
 Part III:  User Overall Satisfaction with the MEIMS Prototype Tool.  Part III 
allows users to give general feedback about the prototype tool. 
 
 
Part I.  Demographic Information 
 Follow the instructions after each numbered question or statement. 
 
1.  I am currently/was attached to a command that primarily performs maintenance 
(military and/or civilian) at the: 
 (Select one from the list and check the box) 
 
 Squadron Level 
 Intermediate Level (AIMD) 
 Depot Level (NADEP) 
 Command does not perform aircraft maintenance 
 Other (describe if other) ________________________________________  
 
2. How long have you been using a computer? 
 (Select one from the list and check the box) 
 
 Less than one month 
 One month to less than one year 
 One year to less than two years 





 3.  What software do you normally use? 
 (Check all boxes that apply) 
 
 Microsoft Office (Word, PowerPoint, Excel, Access) 
What version? 
 (Check all boxes that apply) 
 97 
 2000 
 not sure of version 
 other (describe if other)__________________________ 
 
 
4.  What software application categories are you familiar with? 
 (Check all boxes that apply) 
 
 Word Processing (MS Word, Word Perfect, Word Pro...) 
 Spreadsheet (Excel, Lotus 123, Quattro Pro...) 
 Presentations (PowerPoint, Harvard Graphics...) 
 Graphic Software (Corel Draw, Adobe Photoshop...) 
 E-Mail (Outlook, Eudora, AOL...) 
 Database (Access, DBase...) 
 
 
5.  What computer operating systems do you use? 
 (Check all boxes that apply) 
 
 Windows (3.1, 95, 98, 2000) 




 Other (describe if other) ________________________________________  
 
 
Part II.  User Satisfaction with the Four Sections of the MEIMS Prototype Tool 
Select the category that best matches your impression of each of the below categories 
(and check the box). 
 
           Strongly     Agree        Neutral      Disagree     Strongly  
                       Agree              Disagree 
 
I feel the information                                                                          
on the MEIMS tool was  






      Strongly     Agree        Neutral      Disagree     Strongly  
                       Agree           Disagree 
 
I found the MEIMS                                                                                     




My tour of the MEIMS                                                                        




The information presented on                                                                        





The concept of the MEIMS                                                                        





I found the investigation                                                                                  























 Part III.  User Overall Satisfaction with the MEIMS Prototype Tool 
Please make any comments you may have on the MEIMS Prototype Tool not reflected in 
your comments in sections 1 and 2.  Please use back of paper if you need more room. 
 













































 APPENDIX D 
 
PROTOTYPE MAINTENANCE ERROR INFORMATION 





































 APPENDIX E 
PROTOTYPE MAINTENANCE ERROR INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (MEIMS) METADATA 
 
Table 6: HFACS--ME Tables 
 
Table Name Number of Columns Primary Key 
tblMishaps 11 MishapID 
tblMishapFactors 5 FactorID 
tblFactors 6 3rdLevelCode 
tblAircraft 3 AircraftTypeModel 
tblMishapType 2 MishapTypeCode 
tblMishapClass 2 MishapClassCode 
tblOrganization 3 OrgID 
tblMishapLocation 3 MishapLocationID 
tblDatabaseType 1 DatabaseType 
 
 
Table 7: HFACS--ME Columns 
 
Column Name Table Name Data Type Length 
MishapID TblMishaps int 4
MishapDate TblMishaps datetime 8
Aircraft_FK TblMishaps nvarchar 50
Class_FK TblMishaps nvarchar 5
Type_FK TblMishaps nvarchar 5
LocationID_FK TblMishaps nvarchar 50
OrgID_FK TblMishaps nvarchar 50
ShortDescription TblMishaps nvarchar 255
LongDescription TblMishaps nvarchar 4000
UnderInvestigation TblMishaps bit 1
DatabaseType TblMishaps nvarchar 5
FactorID TblMishapFactors int 4
MishapID_FK TblMishapFactors int 4
FactorSummary TblMishapFactors nvarchar 255
3rdLevelCode_FK TblMishapFactors nvarchar 3
FactorDescription TblMishapFactors nvarchar 4000
3rdLevelCode TblFactors nvarchar 5
3rdLevelDesc TblFactors nvarchar 50
2ndLevelCode TblFactors nvarchar 5
2ndLevelDesc TblFactors nvarchar 50
1stLevelCode TblFactors nvarchar 5




 AircraftTypeModel TblAircraft nvarchar 15
AircraftCategory TblAircraft nvarchar 50
AircraftDescription TblAircraft nvarchar 255
MishapTypeCode TblMishapType nvarchar 5
MishapTypeDefinition TblMishapType nvarchar 255
MishapClassCode TblMishapClass nvarchar 2
MishapClassDefinition TblMishapClass nvarchar 255
OrgID tblOrganization nvarchar 10
OrgName tblOrganization nvarchar 50
DatabaseType tblOrganization nvarchar 1
MishapLocationID tblMishapLocation nvarchar 50
MishapLocation tblMishapLocation nvarchar 50
DatabaseType tblMishapLocation nvarchar 1
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